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Abstract 
We introduce an on-line pricing tactic where airlines post, at the same time and for the 
same flight, fares in different currencies that violate the law of One Price. Unexpectedly for 
an on-line market, we find that price discrimination may be accompanied by arbitrage 
opportunities and that both tend to persist before a flight’s departure. We find discrimination 
to be of a competitive type, although arbitrage opportunities are more likely in concentrated 
routes. Finally, the evidence suggests that discrimination may be used to manage stochastic 
demand. 
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Recent empirical research on electronic commerce has consistently found evidence of 
price dispersion across on-line retailers, but has not reported any case where the same e-
company engages in price discrimination on-line – see Michael Baye et al. (2005) and Glenn 
Ellison and Sara F. Ellison (2005) for a survey. The price transparency of the Internet is 
implicitly assumed not to be conducive to effective on-line price discrimination because the 
shoppers of a company setting a low and a high price for the same product (e.g., in two 
different parts of its website) would very quickly learn to buy only at the low price. To 
overcome this difficulty and extract surplus from their customers, on-line retailers may 
engage in obfuscation strategies by proposing add-ons to the product originally sought (Glenn 
Ellison and Sara F. Ellison, 2004). This is not the case in this paper, where we present 
evidence of different prices being posted by the same e-seller on the same website at the same 
time for exactly the same product.  
Our data are taken from the websites of six European Low Cost Carriers (hereafter, 
LCCs) and pertain to both UK domestic and European international flights. A simple example 
illustrates the nature of the on-line price discrimination tactic employed by our LCCs. 
Consider a flight from, say, London to Madrid. Normally, this corresponds to the first leg of a 
round trip by a British traveller, and to the return leg of a Spanish traveller. The origin of the 
first leg determines the currency used by the LCCs to show the final fares, so the Spanish 
traveller booking a round trip will be offered a fare in Euro while the Briton one in Sterling. 
Assume the booking occurs at the same time: in the absence of on-line price discrimination, 
the ratio of the two fares should be very close to the prevailing exchange rate and the Law of 
One Price should hold (Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Michael Knetter, 1997). However, about 
34% of the almost two million observations in our dataset, collected between June 2002 and 
June 2004, report a difference between the two fares of at least 5 British Sterling or more. 
Thus, our LCCs engage in on-line price discrimination, without resorting to any obfuscation 
strategies aimed at confusing the customer. What enables them to do so is simply that the two 
prices do not appear simultaneously on the same screenshot, and on-line customers have to be 
able to actively engage themselves in a search to compare the fares, something they might not 
be aware of. In addition to presenting a new way to conduct on-line price discrimination, we 
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show therefore that search costs play an important role even in the on-line market for air 
tickets in Europe.1  
The above type of on-line price discrimination is innovative with respect to the 
traditional modes of discrimination associated with airlines, such as the Saturday night stay-
over requirement or the surcharge for one-way tickets (Joanna Stavins, 2001; Stephanie 
Giaume and Sarah Guillou, 2004). Indeed, a feature of European LCCs is to have eliminated 
completely such restrictions,2 as well as any service distinction thus further excluding any 
form of discrimination based on quality (Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen, 1978). Finally, 
price variations due to the inclusion of connecting flights are ruled out by the fact that LCCs 
issue only “point to point” tickets (Eric Clemons et al., 2002).   
An interesting aspect of this new form of on-line price discrimination is that it may or 
may not be associated with arbitrage opportunities. When it is not, the airlines manage to 
segment the markets perfectly. However, for about 10% of our observations for international 
flights the gains from arbitrage outweigh the costs. This is surprising because, firstly, 
arbitrage is assumed to be incompatible with discrimination (Lars Stole, 2005; Jean Tirole, 
1988). Secondly, one would hardly expect occasions for profitable arbitrage to be posted 
systematically on-line. Strikingly, we find strong empirical evidence of persistence over time 
being a characteristic of discriminatory cases and of arbitrage opportunities.  
Dispersion in airline prices may arise from variations in costs of serving different 
passengers or from discriminatory pricing (Severin Borenstein and Nancy L. Rose, 1994). An 
important aspect in our study is that the research design rules out any cost-based source of 
dispersion. Indeed, the two prices in different currencies referred to the same flight and were 
retrieved on-line within at most one hour from each other. Thus, an airline’s demand 
uncertainty and its shadow cost of capacity were identical for each pair of price queries.3 
Hence, any significant divergence between the two prices has to be ascribed to on-line price 
discrimination only. The econometric analysis reveals that this pricing scheme is more likely 
used in less concentrated routes, in larger markets and where charter operators are also 
present: this is in line with the findings in Borenstein and Rose (1994) of dispersion 
                                                
1
 Search engines, e.g. www.traveljungle.co.uk or www.skyscanner.net, are present but they are not 
capable of detecting the type of on-line price discrimination strategy we consider.  
2
 For example, departing on a Monday and returning on a Thursday is likely to cost less than returning 
on a Sunday. In any case, each leg is priced independently at no extra charge for one-way tickets. 
3
 There are, however, cross-sectional variations that we consider in the econometric procedure. 
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increasing with competition. However, the airlines’ decision to post an arbitrage opportunity 
appears to be more likely in highly concentrated routes.  
Some motivating examples, their related theoretical framework and the data collection 
strategy are defined in the next Section, while Section II draws a parallel between the 
deviations from the Law of One Price in Asplund and Friberg (2001) and those in our dataset. 
Section III identifies different types of discriminatory cases by distinguishing whether they 
present arbitrage opportunities. Such distinctions are further investigated in the econometric 
analysis of Section IV, and followed by the concluding remarks of Section V.  
1. Looking for Price Discrimination on-line. 
A. Motivating examples. 
Examples from a LCC’s web site, exhibiting the type of on-line price discrimination 
on which we focus, are shown in Figures 1 to 4. These are made up of two parts: the top one 
shows the fares in British Sterling (hereafter, GBP, i.e. Great Britain Pound) for each leg of a 
round-trip departing from the UK and arriving in another European destination. The bottom 
part reports the fares (in the currency of the country from which the flight originates) for the 
inverted trip, where the outgoing flight is scheduled on the same day of the return flight in the 
top part.4 The same flight appearing in both parts is framed in an oval for ease of comparison.  
Various features of the queries’ results need to be specified. First, the queries reported 
in the two parts of Figures 1-4 were made only a few minutes after the other, therefore ruling 
out any bias arising from changes in prices due to changes in seats’ availability.5 Second, it is 
important to stress that the European LCCs we surveyed set prices for each leg independently 
and that these fares do not change when a customer books a round-trip or a one-way ticket. 
E.g., in Figure 1 the price of 119.99 GBP for the Ancona (AOI) - London Stansted flight on 
July 17th  2005 would have appeared identically even if the query had not been for this single 
flight only. Third, the programme issuing the queries yields fares expressed in the currency of 
the country where the first flight originates. Finally, to make their sites look familiar by 
appearing in the visitor’s language the airlines’ web sites automatically detect the nation in 
which the visitor is located. However, we believe that doing so does not affect the level of 
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 The two parts are taken from two different screenshots, each corresponding to a different query for the 
same flight. They were edited to facilitate and enhance the comparison of fares expressed in different currencies. 
5
 See the Windows bar at the bottom of each part. 
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fares displayed. Indeed, we tried to access the sites using different languages, but the same 
fares were returned. Moreover, the hypothesis that each airline extracts the fares from the 
same dataset (or algorithm) is reinforced by the fact that for most airlines the query results are 
displayed on the same web page, regardless of the language used.6  
Figure 1 reports a non-discriminatory case where the ratio of the fare in Sterling 
(119.99 GBP) and in Euro (169.99 EUR) for the flight coded “FR 125” from Ancona to 
Stansted on July 17th 2005 is very close to the exchange rate on the date of the query, made on 
July 9th 2005. No attempt at price discriminating is highlighted in this example and possible 
differences between the fares are likely to be induced by the differences in the exchange rates 
used by us and by the airline. 
Figures 2 and 3 are essential to capture the nature of our new on-line price 
discrimination’s strategy. It clearly shows how the price in GBP for the flight coded 
“FR2359” is higher than that in Euro. Consider a British traveller wishing to fly from Stansted 
to Dinard on Aug 25th 2005 and return on Sept 1st. In theory this person, instead of booking a 
round-trip ticket and pay 69.99 GBP for the first leg plus 9.99 GBP for the second (which is 
what a query for a round-trip would automatically allow her to do), could buy two separate 
one-way tickets and pay only 0.45 EUR for the return, saving about 9.5 GBP. It is noteworthy 
that arbitrage opportunities can arise only for the return trip. Another example satisfying such 
a condition is shown in Figure 3, for the flight coded “FR 373” from Biarritz to Stansted, 
where the difference between the two fares is about 19 GBP.  
Figure 4 illustrates a case of on-line price discrimination, which is not associated with 
the possibility to engage in arbitrage. Note how the price in GBP for the flight coded “FR 
195” from Bologna Forli to Stansted is about 33 GBP cheaper than the fare quoted in Euro.7 
However, no arbitrage conditions arise in this case because a British traveller would prefer to 
buy a return ticket and not two separate ones. A side effect of this perfect segmentation of the 
two markets is that Italian travellers are adversely discriminated as they are offered a higher 
fare for the same flight.  
                                                
6
 At the time of this draft (June 2006), Ryan Air and EasyJet allow the language to be selected by the 
visitor. Ryan Air and Bmibaby display the results in the same page regardless of the language selected - 
http://www.bookryanair.com/skylights/cgi-bin/skylights.cgi and 
http://www.bmibaby.com/bmibaby/skylights/cgi-bin/skylights.cgi respectively - while Easyjet’s fares are shown 
on a URL that is language-sensitive.  
7
 Interestingly, the fare in Euro for the other flight (coded FR 199) available on the same route and day 
is slightly cheaper, although it falls well within the band of inaction.  
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There are two aspects associated with the exercise of arbitrage in these examples. 
First, its benefit has to be weighed against the extra costs it would generate. Indeed, booking 
two one-way tickets entails having: 1) to pay an extra credit card commission of 4.5 GBP; 2) 
to print an extra ticket; 3) to fill in an extra on-line booking form; 4) to incur search costs to 
verify the presence of arbitrage possibilities and 5) to find out the exchange rate used by the 
credit card provider. The presence of these costs creates a “band of inaction” within which it 
is not worth pursuing arbitrage conditions (Marcus Asplund and Richard Friberg, 2001).8 
Second, the possibility of arbitrage does not necessarily translate into its actual 
implementation. In Figures 2 and 3, a British traveller should have issued two queries, one for 
each single leg. While this would take only little extra time to perform, most individuals 
would naturally issue only a query for a return ticket and it is unlikely that even a very expert 
web-surfer could contemplate the possibility to control for arbitrage opportunities. Such a 
form of bounded rationality arising from psychological inertia increases search costs and may 
thus protect LCCs when they engage in on-line price discrimination entailing arbitrage 
opportunities. This issue is further investigated in Sections III and IV. 
B. Theoretical Framework 
In order to provide a theoretical background useful to comment the empirical findings 
in the remainder of the paper, we now interpret informally the various outcomes in Figures 1 
to 4 in the light of the existing theoretical explanations for price dispersion and discrimination 
on and off-line. Two aspects appear to be central, although their importance varies case by 
case: search costs and the demand uncertainty characterizing the two groups of travellers in 
each country.9 The latter is important because of the perishability of the airlines’ product, and 
the ensuing need to maximize a flight’s load factor.10 
The “standard case” with no on-line price discrimination (Figure 1) is consistent with 
a situation where the airlines are confident that aggregate demand is sufficiently high to fill 
the flight to capacity. Thus, the single price corresponds to the maximum fare a passenger in 
either country is willing to pay, which the airlines may have learnt from either past experience 
or on-line price probes. Search costs are not relevant here, as well as for the case in Figure 4, 
                                                
8
 See Section 3 for a discussion. 
9
 The latter plays a crucial role in the literature on airline pricing – See James Dana (1998 and 2001). 
10
 Very often, some European LCCs offer seats at 0.01 GBP. Leaving any strategic motive aside, this is 
profit enhancing in the presence of perishability, because a filled seat is likely to generate some extra revenues 
from sales of on-board services (food, drinks, scratch cards etc.) 
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where the two markets are perfectly segmented. A difference between Figure 1 and 4 may be 
that the airline believes aggregate demand is not enough to fill the flight to capacity, and 
therefore resorts to standard third-degree price discrimination to maximize a flight’s load 
factor. In this case, the group with the more inelastic demand (i.e., the Italians in Figure 4) is 
located in the country where the flight originates (Bologna Forli’ in Italy), and so no arbitrage 
opportunities arise. 
Undoubtedly, the most challenging case is that of on-line price discrimination with 
arbitrage opportunities (Figures 2 and 3). Demand conditions are the same as in the case of 
Figure 4, so the airline still wants to practice on-line price discrimination. This time, however, 
the high demand group is made up of passengers that are returning to their country of 
residence (the Britons), thereby raising the possibility of arbitrage. Absent search costs, it is 
likely any price divergence would be arbitraged away. It is reasonable to assume that the 
presence of consumers with positive search costs makes on-line price discrimination and 
arbitrage a feasible strategy for the LCCs. Note, however, that even a recent survey on price 
discrimination states as its pre-condition the absence of arbitrage opportunities (Lars Stole, 
2005). It is also worth stressing that in the search-theoretic models surveyed by Michael Baye 
et al. (2005) to explain price dispersion on-line, each firm sets only one price, and price 
dispersion occurs across firms. In our case, the same firm is posting two fares. A theoretical 
explanation of this, when consumers are heterogeneous in their level of search costs, is 
presented in Steven Salop (1977). Assume that within the discriminated group travellers differ 
in their search efficiencies: the inefficient ones then do not search and pay the high price 
while the efficient ones recognize the arbitrage opportunity and pay a lower fare. 
Interestingly, Salop (1977) shows that for high enough search costs, no search activity will be 
conducted: this is consistent with our discussion of how a (possibly large) proportion of on-
line consumers does not envisage the possibility of checking the price of two one-way tickets.  
C. Data Collection 
Since May 2002, we collected the fares using an “electronic spider”, which connected 
directly to the websites of only the main LCCs (i.e., Ryanair, Buzz, Easyjet, GoFly) operating 
in Great Britain at the time. 
The dataset includes daily flights information from June 2002 up to, and including, 
June 2004, for a total of 25 months. Over such a period, a number of important events took 
place, which are reflected in the dataset. First, a series of takeovers occurred: Easyjet acquired 
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GoFly (December 2002) and Ryan Air took over Buzz (March 2003). Second, new LCCs 
began their operations: the “spider” was upgraded to retrieve fares from the Bmibaby and 
MyTravelLite sites.  
In order to account for the variety of fares offered by the airlines at different times 
prior to departure, every day we programmed the spider to collect the fares for departures due, 
respectively, 1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 63 and 70 days from the date of the query. 
Henceforth, these will be referred to as “booking days”. So, for instance, if we consider 
London Stansted-Rome Ciampino as the route of interest, and assume the query for the flights 
operated by a given airline was carried out on April 1st 2003, the spider would retrieve the 
prices for both the London Stansted-Rome Ciampino and the Rome Ciampino-London 
Stansted routes for departures on 2/4/2003, 5/4/2003, 8/4/2003, 11/4/2003 and so on. The 
return flight for both types of directional journey was scheduled one week after the departure, 
but each leg was recorded independently in the dataset (see Appendix A). For those routes 
where an airline operates more than one flight per day, all fares for every flight were 
collected. Thus, for every daily flight we managed to obtain up to 13 prices that differ by the 
time interval from the day of departure (i.e., the booking day). The main reason to do so was 
to satisfy the need to identify the evolution of fares - from more than two months prior to 
departure to the day before departure – which has been noted to be very variable for the case 
of LCCs (Eric Pels and Piet Rietveld, 2004; Stephanie Giaume and Sarah Guillou, 2004).11  
The collection of the airfares has been carried out everyday at the same time: in 
addition to airfares we collected the name of the company, the time and date of the query, the 
departure date, the scheduled departure and arrival time, the origin and destination airports 
and the flight identification code. In addition to UK domestic routes, flights to destinations in 
the following continental European countries were considered: Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, 
Czech Republic, Italy, France, Spain, Holland, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Austria. 
To complement the price data with market structure characteristics, secondary data on 
the traffic for all the routes and all the airlines flying to the countries indicated above was 
obtained from the UK Civil Aviation Authority (henceforth, CAA).12 For each combination of 
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 While the spider could have retrieved any number of prices, in practice the need to reduce both the 
number of queries made to an airline server and the time of programme execution to a manageable level, led to 
the design above. 
12
 See www.caa.co.uk 
 10 
company, route and departure period (i.e., month/year), the CAA provided the number of 
monthly seats, the number of monthly passengers and the monthly load factors.  
Table 1 illustrates how the prices retrieved from the Internet represent an accurate 
sample of the activity of each of the LCCs in the markets we consider. It compares the 
number of routes for which we have price data with the actual total number of routes operated 
by each airline. The latter figure is taken from the CAA dataset, which also provides the 
number of routes where our LCCs face competition by either a major Full Service Carrier or 
another LCC. To test the spider’s functionality, initially we limited the number of surveyed 
routes. Indeed, in August 2002 the percentage of routes with prices was 63% of the total 
number operated by Ryan Air, 50% for Easyjet, 64% for Buzz and 46% for GoFly. However, 
thanks to the speed of the programme, within a few months such percentages could be 
increased significantly for all the airlines, to cover 90% or more of the total routes they 
operated. Considering that the spider took all the prices for all the daily flights, the price 
dataset provides an exhaustive illustration of the on-line pricing activity of each airline. Table 
1 also shows that the airlines differ in the degree of competition they face. For instance, in 
about 21-26% of EasyJet’s routes at least another competitor is also present. At the other 
extreme, Ryan Air (and Buzz to a lesser extent) faced competition in a very limited subset of 
routes. The other airlines operate in a smaller number of routes, which is probably why 
competitive routes account for about one-third of the total. Such differences may be driven by 
the choice of the arrival destinations. Ryan Air and Buzz chose almost exclusively secondary 
airports that may be many miles away from the city of arrival, while the other airlines also fly 
to major airports where Full Service Carriers also land.  
D. Identifying Price discrimination on-line 
Each query for a round-trip was carried out separately (but simultaneously) assuming 
the outgoing flight either originated in UK or in continental Europe.13 The first procedure 
created a dataset with fares denominated in GBP, the second one with fares expressed in the 
currency of the originating country. These two datasets were then matched using a code 
combining the values of airline, route, flight code, day of departure and booking day. Such a 
matching strategy enables the comparison of the on-line fares for the same flight available at 
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 For the UK domestic routes, in the second case we simply inverted the direction of the trip. 
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the same moment to two travellers in different countries. Appendix A provides more insights 
into the matching procedure. 
It was impossible to guarantee that the two fares were collected at exactly the same 
time. Thus, new ticket purchases occurring between the collections of the two fares may be 
responsible for the fares’ difference. This is because new purchases would change the shadow 
cost of capacity, a source of price dispersion (Borenstein and Rose, 1994). This potential 
problem was tackled in two ways. The “spider” operated overnight, thereby minimising the 
possibility of intervening purchases.14 Further, the “spider” saved the exact time in which 
each fare was retrieved: the sample analysed in this study includes only pairs of fares 
collected within a one-hour interval.15 Thus, any detection of price dispersion can only be 
ascribed to on-line price discrimination, as cost conditions refer to the same flight, capacity 
level and booking day.  
2. Deviations from the Law of One Price. 
The previous examples in Figures 2 and 3 configure a situation very similar to the one 
described by Marcus Asplund and Richard Friberg (2001), where customers of Scandinavian 
duty-free stores could pay the same item choosing a catalogue nominal price expressed either 
in Swedish kronor (SEK) or in Finnish markka (FIM). Significant deviations from the Law of 
One Price (LOP) arose because nominal prices were fixed until a new catalogue was printed, 
while the exchange rate between SEK and FIM was free to fluctuate. Deviations were thus 
mostly due to the presence of high fixed “menu costs” which led the Duty Free companies to 
issue a new catalogue only when arbitrage conditions had become particularly conspicuous 
and costly.  
Figures 2 to 4 show cases of deviations from the LOP. However, menu costs are 
negligible in electronic commerce, which begs the question of whether the airlines 
systematically engage in on-line price discrimination. We try to answer this by detecting the 
                                                
14
 As Ellison and Ellison (2005) discuss, inertia in Internet prices is often observed, suggesting that 
companies do not continually monitor the market situation and reoptimize. In the case at hand, we casually noted 
that after buying tickets on-line from the LCCs in our study, fares remained unchanged despite the obvious 
reduction in the seat availability. 
15
 Intervening purchases between the collection of the two prices should be more likely as the interval 
increases. Thus, we should expect a greater discrepancy between the two prices when the interval is large. We 
find no support to this hypothesis in the data, when we allow only a maximum of a one-hour interval. This is 
shown in a Table not reported to save on space, but available on request.  
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presence of deviations from the LOP, which, given our data collection strategy, can only be 
caused by on-line price discrimination.  
Let firtcb be a flight offered by carrier i, on route r, with departure scheduled on date t, 
code flight c and whose fares are posted b days before t (that is, b is the booking day). Route r 
is defined as an airport pair. The airlines post two prices, which are expressed in the same 
currency for domestic flights, or in two different currencies depending on the country where 
the flight originates. The following analysis holds for both domestic and international flights. 
Let EUirtcbP  and 
UK
irtcbP  identify the prices for flight firtcb when offered in a continental European 
currency (EU) and in the UK currency (i.e., GBP). Define UKirtcbEUirtcb PP /=Φ . Denote b UKEUe /  as 
the nominal exchange rate, the currency EU price of currency UK, available on the date (t-b). 
If LOP holds for flight firtcb, then: 
b
UKEU
EU
irtcb
EU
irtcb ePP // ==Φ                                                                                          (1) 
or  
( )[ ] 0/ / =−=∆ UKirtcbb UKEUEUirtcb PeP .                                                                               (2) 
Throughout the paper, ∆ is expressed in GBP. The LOP fails to hold if 1/ / ≠Φ
b
UKEUe  
or 0>∆ . For the latter case, Table 2 reports the percentile distribution of the absolute value 
of ∆ by airline and type of flights. Even noting that small values of ∆  may be induced by 
differences between the exchange rates used by us and by the airlines, half of the almost two 
millions observations for international flights report a |∆|>3.41, while the LOP holds 
unconditionally (i.e., |∆|=0) for at least 95% of the observed domestic fares, with the minor 
exception of fares posted by Ryan Air. Such a finding suggests two considerations. One, 
presumably the airlines try to avoid the bad publicity of being found out practicing price 
discrimination strategies, which can be more easily noted when the fares are in the same 
currency. Two, the comparability of two fares in different currencies entails the gathering by a 
passenger of detailed information on b UKEUe / , which is a costly activity that not everyone is 
ready to undertake. Thus for international flights, search costs seem to shield the airlines from 
the risk of negative publicity. In turn, the airlines have thus more leeway in engaging in on-
line price discrimination as a yield management strategy aimed at maximizing load factors. 
Indeed, Table 2 shows that most airlines, with the exception of EasyJet and Buzz, have at 
least 25% (or more) of their fares with a |∆|>5.  
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Table 3 presents values of UKirtcb
EU
irtcb PP /=Φ  and 
b
UKEUe /  broken down by airline and 
country. It confirms that the LOP holds for UK domestic flights, while it generally does not 
for international flights, with the exception of those operated by EasyJet, for which the two 
statistics are very similar across countries. BmiBaby and MyTravel systematically violate the 
LOP as, in all the countries they serve, their fares expressed in the continental European 
currency are, on average, higher than the one expressed in GBP. On the other hand, Ryan Air, 
which Tables 2 and 3 reveal to be the airline which is more heavily reliant on international 
on-line price discrimination, tends to post a higher fare in GBP for flights to and from Ireland, 
Holland and Austria, with the opposite holding for most of the other countries. For Buzz and 
GoFly, deviations from the LOP are particularly large in specific countries, namely 
Switzerland and France.   
To further highlight the deviations from LOP in our dataset, Figure 5 shows, for each 
airline, the kernel density for UKirtcb
EU
irtcb PP /=Φ  and 
b
UKEUe /  for flights to countries adopting the 
European common currency, the Euro. The overlapping of the two distribution is indicative of 
adherence to the LOP: this only seems to be the case of EasyJet, while for all the other LCCs 
the two distributions are either disjoint (BmiBaby and MyTravelLite) or the distribution of Φ  
presents thicker and longer tails (Ryan Air, Buzz and GoFly). Generally in Figure 5, Φ  
appears to be more dispersed than the distribution of the exchange rate between the Euro and 
the GBP. 
Because we observe many cases where the LOP fails to hold, and given the way our 
data was collected, we conclude that the evidence in this Section supports the notion that most 
LCCs have actively pursued on-line price discrimination strategies. However, we have not 
determined the extent to which these are associated with arbitrage opportunities. That is, if the 
Internet has created a “frictionless market” where arbitrage opportunities are instantly wiped 
away by costless search and negligible menu costs, we should expect very few cases of on-
line price discrimination with arbitrage, as in Figures 2 and 3. This is further investigated in 
the next Section.  
III. Price Discrimination and Arbitrage 
In this section we investigate the extent to which LCCs pursue discriminatory tactics 
and allow the possibility of arbitrage opportunities to arise. To this purpose, we constructed 
the discrete variable “Discrimination Type”, taking four values, each representing one of the 
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three different situations depicted in Figures 1 to 4, plus a fourth case where arbitrage 
opportunities are not profitable. Indeed, recall that in order to exercise arbitrage a customer 
has to incur the following costs: 1) a credit card commission of 4.50 GBP imposed by the 
airline; 2) a commission on the transaction imposed by the credit card company, normally in 
the form of exchange rate which is less favourable than the official one we used: we assume 
such a commission to be 5% of the paid price; 3) other non-pecuniary costs associated with 
arbitrage, whose value we approximate as 1.50GBP (see Section 1). Hence, the “cost of 
arbitrage” is given by: 
)/,min(05.00.6 bEUirtcbUKirtcb ePPAC +=                                                                             (3) 
Thus, AC increases with the value of the transaction. “Discrimination Type”, is 
defined as follows. A value of “zero” is assigned to non-discriminatory observations, that is, 
those with |∆|<5 (see also Figure 1). We deem a price difference of less than 5 GBP to be 
sufficiently small to consider the two groups of passengers as being offered the same fare. A 
value “1” for “Discrimination Type” identifies discriminatory observations with no arbitrage 
conditions, while those with arbitrage opportunities are assigned the values “2” and “3” 
depending on whether the gain from arbitrage is below or above its cost AC, respectively. The 
formal definitions are reported in the Appendix B. It is noteworthy how for values greater 
than zero, George Stigler’s (1987) definition of price discrimination holds, as the marginal 
cost for a seat booked at the same time for the same flight has to be the same regardless of 
whether the booking takes place in UK or in continental Europe. 
A. Assessing the presence of arbitrage opportunities on-line. 
In Table 4, the frequencies for the values of “Discrimination Type” are broken down 
by airline and departure location for the sample of international flights.16 Overall, about 9.4% 
of the observations are associated with profitable opportunities of arbitrage, 6.4% present 
non-profitable arbitrage conditions, while 18.2% exhibit characteristics of on-line price 
discrimination without arbitrage. However, there are clear differences across the airlines. The 
Total rows show how Ryan Air is the company with the lowest percentage of non-
discriminatory cases (47.9%), immediately followed by Bmibaby (59.7%), GoFly (61.1%) 
and MyTravelLite (61.9%). Ryan Air and GoFly are the companies reporting by far the 
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 From now on, only international flights are considered, given that domestic flights are generally not 
used for on-line price discrimination purposes. 
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highest percentage of cases with arbitrage, 19.3% and 13.3% respectively, while only 5% or 
less of the fares posted by the other companies satisfy the arbitrage conditions. Indeed, these 
are extremely rare for EasyJet (only 1.1%), which reports 83.7% of non-discriminatory fares. 
Interestingly, for all the LCCs the total number of observation with “Discrimination Type” 
equal to 1 is of a similar magnitude to the sum of total observations with and without 
profitable arbitrage conditions.  
Other similarities between Ryan Air and GoFly are shown in Table 4. For both airlines 
we retrieved a larger proportion of arbitrage opportunities for flights departing from 
continental Europe (thus possibly benefiting British travellers). These account for 27.3% and 
14.6% of Ryan Air and GoFly cases, respectively. At the same time, for the same airlines a 
larger share of cases with “Discrimination Type” equal to 1 (respectively, 35.8% and 23.2%) 
is found to depart from the UK, thus adversely discriminating British travellers relative to 
their continental European counterparts returning from a visit to UK. However, we also found 
a significant amount of cases where non-UK resident travellers are either offered arbitrage 
opportunities (11.3% for Ryan Air and 12.0% for GoFly) or are the victims of on-line price 
discrimination (15.7% and 14.1%, respectively).  
Recall from Table 3 how BmiBaby and MyTravelLite systematically recorded values 
of UKirtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  above the relevant exchange rate. Furthermore, recall that arbitrage 
opportunities arise only for the second leg, that is, the return flight. Table 4 shows that for 
BmiBaby, we retrieved 8325 cases of profitable arbitrage opportunities for flights departing 
from the UK, while only 211 were from continental Europe. That is, BmiBaby offers 
arbitrage opportunities almost exclusively to travellers residing in a continental European 
country. However, they are also almost exclusively the victims of on-line price discrimination 
(i.e., when “Discrimination Type” is equal to 1). Indeed, in 34357 cases (40.8%) departing 
from continental Europe, BmiBaby offered a fare b UKEU
EU
irtcb eP //  for a first leg flight, which is at 
least 5GBP higher than that offered to Britons returning to their country. A similar analysis 
holds also for MyTravelLite, thus helping to shed further lights on the figures reported in 
Table 3. Furthermore, both airlines exhibit about 14% of case for which it is not worth 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities. The figures in Table 4 seem to suggest that, with the 
exception of Ryan Air and GoFly, all the other airlines were reluctant to offer viable arbitrage 
opportunities.  
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Table 5 shows the mean values of ∆ , of the arbitrage cost AC and of UKirtcbP , broken 
down by “Discrimination Type”. Non-discriminatory observations are generally associated 
with lower fares. Arbitrage cost does not play a central role in the first two columns; as 
expected in the third it is higher than the benefit from arbitrage. The opposite holds in the last 
column where the average net gain from arbitrage, given by the difference between ∆  and 
AC, varies by airline: it is rather small for BmiBaby, and between 8-13 GBP for the other 
airlines. Arbitrage opportunities are thus worth pursuing, especially considering that bookings 
may be made for parties of more than one individual. 
B. Reconciling the co-existence of Price Discrimination and Arbitrage. 
The analysis of Tables 4 and 5 has clearly highlighted how most LCCs have made 
extensive use of on-line price discrimination strategies. In the theoretical framework we have 
argued that the economic rationale behind them is likely to lie in the standard textbook 
analysis of third degree on-line price discrimination combined with the airlines’ belief that the 
group of consumers with a higher willingness to pay is not numerous enough to fill the flight 
to capacity.  
An innovative aspect of our analysis is the simultaneous on-line presence of price 
discrimination and arbitrage opportunities. As in Asplund and Friberg (2001) we do not have 
information regarding whether the customers have taken advantage of the opportunities 
offered. However, the indirect evidence from their case and ours can provide interesting 
insights. Asplund and Friberg (2001) argue that the practice of dual price setting was 
abandoned because the high volatility of the exchange rate between SEK and FIM offered 
large arbitrage opportunities to consumers. In our case, the data covers the period June 2002-
June 2004. However, the evidence we retrieved and report in Figures 1 to 4 was collected 
much later, in 2005 and in April 2006, from Ryan Air’s web site. This suggests that amongst 
the airlines that our evidence reveals to be heavily committed to on-line price discrimination 
strategies (namely, Ryan Air and GoFly), the one still active has not abandoned them but, on 
the contrary, has carried on practicing them. This is consistent with two distinct, but not 
incompatible explanations. 
First, the enduring and systematic practice of on-line price discrimination hints that 
LCCs’ customers may have remained largely unaware of the presence of arbitrage 
opportunities, despite LCCs sell their tickets almost exclusively on-line. This is further 
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evidence that the Internet is providing firms with new and imaginative price setting schemes. 
But unlike the firms selling computer RAM described by Glenn Ellison and Sarah F. Ellison 
(2004), LCCs do not need to implement “search obfuscation” techniques. Indeed, different 
prices for the same flight may be available on the same web site at the same time.17 However, 
they can be found out only if the on-line customers run two queries, instead of one. Thus, the 
hurdle to overcome is not technical, or related to significant differences in the opportunity 
cost of time to run an extra query, which would only take a few more seconds. It is mainly 
associated with the natural propensity of the great majority of travellers to search for 
information on a round-trip ticket (which is the default option in the on-line query form). That 
is, we argue that consumers’ behaviour exhibit a form of psychological inertia. The ensuing 
bounded rationality reduces the likelihood of searching what the price of two single tickets 
could be. This is tantamount to thinking of consumers who are less adept in understanding the 
subtleties of airlines’ on-line pricing as having high search costs (Steven Salop, 1977). In 
turn, the airlines, protected by the presence of search costs, have little to fear that arbitrage 
opportunities will be extensively exploited. 18 Indeed, in Table 4, about 19% of cases from 
Ryan Air present arbitrage conditions. This is quite a high proportion, hinting that these 
opportunities are seldom taken.  
Second, arbitrage chances may be intentionally “up for grabs”. That is, LCCs post 
them specifically for the purpose of being exercised or are not too worried if some savvy 
Internet-surfer recognizes them. This leads to the natural question of under what 
circumstances the LCCs engage in on-line price discrimination with and without arbitrage.  
IV. Empirical model 
We begin investigating what drives the different values of “Discrimination Type” by 
looking at Table 6, where each cell reports the percentage number of observations by seasons 
(identified by the Summer – April to October - and Winter – November to March - 
timetables), booking day and classes of fares for UKirtcbP  expressed in GBP. Within each of these 
categories, significant differences can be observed. Discriminatory cases are more likely 
                                                
17
 Some airlines, however, have recently begun to engage in obfuscation practices similar to the ones 
described in Ellison and Ellison (2004). For instance, travel insurance is now automatically included in the order, 
and the customers have to unclick to avoid being charged for it. Moreover, uncertainty about the final price 
arises also because the charge for landing fees and airport taxes is not specified together with the fares.  
18
 It is possible that the airlines may tolerate arbitrage only to a certain extent, and programme their sites 
accordingly. 
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during the Summer season, although it is not so for pure arbitrage cases. Non-discriminatory 
observations increase with the booking day, while generally arbitrage opportunities are more 
likely for late booking fares, those available from 14 up to 7 days prior to departure. Both 
findings reflect the fact that summer and late booking fares are generally higher and thus 
provide more scope for large differences between UKirtcbP  and 
EU
irtcbP . Indeed, when 70≥
UK
irtcbP , 
more than 65% of the observations are discriminatory in nature, although only 10.6% offer 
profitable arbitrage opportunities.  
A. Econometric methodology and dependent variables 
In the econometric investigation, we jointly study: (1) the extent to which some factors 
may affect the likelihood of observing an airline posting discriminatory fares, and (2) for the 
sub-sample of discriminatory cases, the impact of the same factors in driving an airline’s 
decision to offer arbitrage opportunities. To model these two discrete variables and take 
account of the sample selection problem arising because arbitrage can only occur within 
discriminatory cases, we employ a bivariate probit model with censoring setting (William 
Greene, 1998 and 2003, pp.713-714; Piga and Vivarelli, 2004). Formally the model can be 
represented as follows: 
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Subscripts are as in Section 2, while *1irtcby  and 
*2
irtcby  are latent, unobserved variables 
representing the airlines’ net benefit from posting a discriminatory case and an arbitrage 
opportunity, respectively. Indeed, the discrete variable y1, which will be denoted as 
“Discriminatory”, assumes the value of zero when “Discrimination Type” is also zero; 
“Discriminatory” is equal to 1 for values of “Discrimination Type” greater or equal to 1. The 
other discrete variable y2, which we denote as “Arbitrage”, is zero when “Discrimination 
Type” is equal to 1 or 2, and takes the value 1 when “Discrimination Type” is equal to 3. No 
value is attributed to “Arbitrage” when “Discrimination Type” is zero, as arbitrage conditions 
should be studied only within the sub-sample of cases where “Discriminatory” is equal to 1. 
Failing to take this sample selection into account by applying a standard bivariate probit 
model where “Arbitrage” is estimated on the full sample would result in biased estimates. 
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That is, in a standard bivariate probit approach the factors affecting the probability to observe 
a non-discriminatory case would not be separated from factors influencing the likelihood of 
posting a discriminatory fare that is not associated with arbitrage opportunities.19 
Furthermore, estimating two independent equations could lead to wrong inference if their 
residuals were correlated. Finally, to account for the fact that for each daily flight we have 
repeated observations, the estimated residuals jε~ , j=1,2, are robust to heteroschedasticity and 
serial correlation within each (irt) cluster. 
B – The regressors 
Imagine an airline has a prior belief that a certain flight is likely to realize a low load-
factor. We argue that to counteract this, the airline may want to engage in the pricing schemes 
we presented, in order to attract demand from the price elastic group of consumers. To test if 
the airlines specifically choose particular flights to practice on-line price discrimination we 
check if discriminatory observations persist over time. Recall how for each flight identified by 
a irtc group, we have up to 11 observations of fares’ pairs, each one for a different booking 
day. We create the dummy “Persistence” equal to 1 if the observation in the previous booking 
day is discriminatory. A strictly positive coefficient for “Persistence” is expected in both 
equations in (4).  
Table 7 shows some descriptive statistics for “Persistence” and the other main 
regressors, broken down by the values of the dependent variables. For about 50% of 
discriminatory observations, the airlines persist in applying the same technique in the 
following booking day. Furthermore, there are about 7% of non-discriminatory cases that 
belong to a flight for which in the previous booking day we observe a case of discriminatory 
fares. Table 7 also shows that “Persistence” is distributed almost identically across 
discriminatory cases with and without arbitrage.  
We use the monthly number of flights by an airline in a route to obtain the Herfindahl 
Index in a route (henceforth, “HHI route”).20 Following Borenstein and Rose (1994), if 
discrimination is of a “monopoly-type”, then the coefficient in the “Discriminatory” equation 
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 Greene (1998) uses this model to distinguish the factors affecting the probability of default in credit 
card loans from the determinants of the antecedent decision to obtain a credit card. Similarly, Piga and Vivarelli 
(2004) argue that the sample of firms engaged in collaborative R&D activity is not randomly selected, but 
depends on the firms’ decision to conduct R&D. 
20
 To derive market shares, we used the monthly number of flights by each airline in a route. Flights are 
preferable to number of passengers as flights are decided in the previous season, remain stable within a season 
and are therefore not jointly determined with prices. 
 20 
should be positive. If however, discrimination increases as the route becomes more 
competitive, then we can infer that the airlines use it as a strategic competitive weapon. A 
similar argument can be made with regards to the relationship between concentration and 
arbitrage opportunities. Table 7 does not reveal any significant difference, although it 
indicates the airlines in our sample generally operate in highly concentrated routes. 
Thanks to such post-liberalisation measures as the "grandfather" rights, established 
carriers (mostly former national `flag-carriers’) have continued to enjoy a dominant position 
in large European markets.21 “Market Size”, obtained as the share of total flights in a city-pair 
over the total flights in a nation’s sub-area,22 is likely to affect positively the likelihood to post 
discriminatory fares, as the airlines may use discriminatory pricing as a competitive weapon. 
By the same token, its impact on an airline’s propensity to offer arbitrage opportunities is 
likely to be positive, although larger markets also provide reasons for curtailing such a 
strategy, e.g., because too many customers may be available to exercise it.23  
The presence of competition from charter operators may boost the need to engage in 
on-line price discrimination and to offer arbitrage opportunities. We expect the monthly share 
of charter passengers over the total number of passengers in a city-pair (“Shr charter pass.”) to 
be positively correlated with discriminatory conditions and arbitrage opportunities. However, 
the presence of charter operators seems less strong in route with arbitrage opportunities 
(Table 7).  
If an airline is offering a service to a given destination from many UK departure 
airports, then the need to realise a sufficiently high load factor in every route is likely to 
provide a strong incentive to implement on-line price discrimination strategies with and 
without arbitrage. Hence, the regressor “N UK departures”, measuring from how many UK 
airports the airline is serving the same destination, should positively enter in both regressions. 
In the empirical model we also control for a number of fixed effects by using various 
sets of dummies. In light of previous findings regarding company specificities, a dummy is 
used to identify each airline. Furthermore, the previous discussion has highlighted that for 
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 A post-liberalisation measure, the grandfather’s rights allocated slots in the main European, most 
congested airports to airlines on the basis of previous use. 
22
 The UK, as well as the largest destination countries, Italy, France, Germany and Spain, were divided 
in three sub-areas: North, Centre and South. This variable is calculated as the share of total flights in a city-pair 
(say, London to Rome) over the total flights to the Centre of Italy (the sub-area where Rome is located). For 
smaller countries, the denominator is given by taking the whole country. 
23
 The terms city-pair (which includes all the airports in a city pair) and market are used 
interchangeably.  
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each booking day price dispersion is caused only by on-line price discrimination. However, as 
demand is revealed over time, the airlines’ propensity to engage in on-line price 
discrimination may vary to reflect the shadow cost of capacity (Borenstein and Rose, 1994). 
That is, stochastic peak-load pricing may still be responsible for cross-sectional variations in 
our sample. Therefore, we include a set of dummy variables for each booking day, which are 
summarized in Table 6. Few days before departure the airlines can more precisely gauge if the 
flight will be full. Both decisions to engage in on-line price discrimination and to offer a 
discount via arbitrage may be therefore motivated by a high probability of a low load-factor. 
Thus, we expect such decisions to be positively associated with the dummies identifying the 
fares posted only a few days before departure.  
Load factors’ realisation may also vary with the time of day and with the day of the 
week a flight is scheduled to fly. Indeed, as argued in Borenstein and Rose (1994), pricing 
decision may differ for peak and off-peak flights. We therefore include dummies for departure 
times and days of the week.24 These, together with a dummy for each nation in Table 3, are 
not reported to save on space. Full sets of estimates are available on request.   
C. Results 
To estimate equation (4), only the sample of flights to and from continental Europe 
was used, i.e. UK domestic flights were not considered given their strict adherence to the LOP 
(see Table 2). Model 1 includes all the airlines; Model 2 excludes EasyJet because of its 
limited involvement in pursuing on-line price discrimination strategies; Model 3 considers 
Ryan Air exclusively. Given the sample size and the non-linearity of the method, in order to 
focus on the economic impact of each regressor we chose to report two marginal effects in 
Table 8 and not the estimated coefficients, which are available on request.  All models present 
similar results, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The Wald Test for independent equations 
clearly rejects the hypothesis of no correlation of the two equations’ residuals for all models 
and thus lends support to the bivariate approach, as opposed to two single probit equations. 
As far as the impact of “Persistence” is concerned, observing a discriminatory case in 
the previous booking day increases the probability of observing a similar case in the current 
booking day by 46%-50%. The extremely high z-statistics indicates that a large proportion of 
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 The times of day were constructed as follows to reflect schedule convenience: "<=8.20am"; "8.21-10.45am"; 
"10.46-12.40pm"; "12.41-14.40pm"; "14.41-16.40pm"; "16.41-18.40pm"; "18.41- 20.40pm"; ">20.40pm"  
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observations for the same flight, collected at different times prior to departure, are 
discriminatory in nature. We infer that price discrimination is a tactic used by the airline after 
it has targeted a specific flight. This is further confirmed in Models 2 and 3, where a change 
from zero to one in “Persistence” enhances the chance of an arbitrage condition by 2-3%. 
Both results together suggest that arbitrage opportunities, rather than disappearing from the 
airlines’ web sites, exhibit a tendency to be posted repeatedly before a flight’s departure. 
The likelihood of observing a discriminatory case falls by 7-10% with a unit change in 
the Herfindhal index around its mean value. Price discrimination is thus more likely in the 
less concentrated routes of our sample and appears to be motivated by the need to meet the 
competitive pressure of other airlines (see Severin Borenstein and Nancy Rose, 1994 for a 
discussion). This is further supported by the findings for “Market Size “ and the presence of 
charter operators, whose unit change increases the probability of a discriminatory case by 15-
17% for the former and 34-49% for the latter variable. However, the probability of an 
arbitrage opportunity increases with route concentration (3-9%), is independent of market size 
(only significant in Model 3) and increases with the presence of charter airlines (12-14%). As 
expected, larger markets provide conflicting incentives for the use of arbitrage strategies, 
which the airlines seem more willing to offer where they enjoy a dominant position and when 
they face charter operators’ competition. As the variable “N UK departures” indicates, an 
airline’s network structure appears to have a negligible impact on both marginal effects. 
With the exception of Model 1, discriminatory cases appear to be up to 7 percentage 
points more likely in the last 14 days before a flight departs, when the airlines have been able 
to gauge quite accurately the demand for a flight. The fact that fares posted 70 days prior to 
departure have a 4-10% higher chance to be discriminatory also suggest that the airlines 
identify the flights amenable to price discrimination at an early stage. Particularly in Model 3, 
the impact of booking days on the likelihood of an arbitrage case is generally stronger for 
early booking days (4-5%).  
The effects of the airlines’ dummies are consistent with the findings in Tables 2 to 4. 
Finally, no clear indication comes from the analysis of the Summer season dummy.  
V. Conclusions 
The low search costs of the Internet facilitate price comparisons on-line that may even 
lead to lower off-line prices (Jeffrey R. Brown and Austan Goolsbee, 2002). To protect 
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themselves from Bertrand-type competition, e-retailers may either try to build brand 
allegiance or engage in obfuscation strategies (Eric Brynjolfsson and Michael D. Smith., 
2000; Ellison and Ellison, 2004 and 2005). Given the high price transparency of the Internet, 
it would therefore seem unlikely to observe the same company offering two different prices 
for the same product on-line.  
The thrust of this paper is to show, through a particular data collection design, how 
some important European Low Cost Carriers systematically posted fares on-line that violate 
the Law of One Price (Fred S. McChesney et al., 2004). Our analysis still supports the notion 
of low search costs on-line. Indeed we find airlines do not practice on-line price 
discrimination for U.K. domestic flights, because their fares, being expressed in the same 
currency, can be more easily compared. As discrimination is applied only to international 
flights, we argue that other forms of search costs remain important, even if the transaction 
takes place on-line: an obvious example is learning about the prevailing exchange rate. 
However, the strongest factor facilitating on-line price discrimination is probably bounded 
rationality, i.e., the inability of an on-line customer to conceive the possibility to control for 
the presence of arbitrage opportunities, which make up 9.4% observations in our dataset, but 
account for about one-fifth of Ryan Air’s observations.  
Furthermore, we discuss how the airlines may actually benefit from having customers 
acting as arbitrageurs, as this may help increase a flight’s load-factor. Indeed, the evidence 
indicates discriminatory cases are more likely within the two weeks prior to a flights’ 
departure, when the airlines have better information about demand realization. When 
associated with the offering of discounts via arbitrage, the form of on-line price 
discrimination we present is therefore likely to be welfare-enhancing, as it does not penalize 
the airlines and allows consumption by customers that otherwise would not have purchased 
the ticket. The usual ambiguous effects on welfare remain when the airlines charge differing 
fares that cannot be arbitraged away. However, the pricing strategies we analyse do not seem 
to meet the conditions to be deemed discriminatory pursuant to Article 82(c) of the Treaty of 
the European Community because, although such strategies “apply dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions”, Article 82 (c) does not apply to transactions with final consumers 
(Damien Geradin and Nicolas Petit, 2005).   
Asplund and Friberg (2001) document how the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities, 
arising in cases of deviations from the Law of One Price, likely led to a change in the way 
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prices were listed in Scandinavian Duty-Free shops’ catalogues. This does not seem to have 
happened for at least some of our LCCs. We complement our data set covering the period 
June 2002 - June 2004 with screen shots, retrieved as late as April 2006, showing examples of 
on-line price discrimination cases. We infer that at least one large low-cost carrier (namely, 
Ryan Air) has been actively pursuing on-line price discrimination strategies for many years 
even if they entailed offering arbitrage opportunities. 
We use a bivariate model with sample selection to study the factors affecting the 
airlines’ decisions to both post discriminatory fares and offer arbitrage opportunities. The 
evidence suggests that the probability to observe on-line price discrimination is inversely 
related to a route concentration. This is similar to the findings in Borenstein and Rose (1994) 
of competitive price dispersion. Arbitrage, on the contrary, seems to be more likely in 
situations where the airlines enjoy a high degree of market power. A striking result is that 
over a period of 70 days discriminatory cases for a flight are observed repeatedly before a 
flight’s departure. Even more strikingly for an on-line market, arbitrage opportunities also 
tend to persist over time. This is in shark contrast with the conventional wisdom of arbitrage 
being incompatible with discriminatory pricing, especially in markets with low search, menu 
or transportation costs. On the whole, the evidence seems to suggest how airlines do not seem 
particularly worried by the price transparency of the Internet, but, rather, use it to maximize 
their yield in a route.  
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Figure 1: The “standard” case with no price discrimination. 
 
 
Note: The top part shows the fares for a round-trip originating in the UK. The bottom part reports the 
fares for a round-trip originating in a continental European location. The “Coming Back” flight 
enclosed in the oval in the top part is the same as the “Going Out” flight in the oval of the bottom part. 
The fare in the European currency is translated using the current exchange rate on the date of the 
query. 
~118GBP 
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Figure 2: An example of price discrimination with arbitrage 
 
 
Note: The top part shows the fares for a round-trip originating in the UK. The bottom part reports the 
fares for a round-trip originating in a continental European location. The “Coming Back” flight 
enclosed in the oval in the top part is the same as the “Going Out” flight in the oval of the bottom part. 
The fare in the European currency is translated using the current exchange rate on the date of the 
query. 
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Figure 3: Another example of price discrimination with arbitrage. 
 
 
Note: The top part shows the fares for a round-trip originating in the UK. The bottom part reports the 
fares for a round-trip originating in a continental European location. The “Coming Back” flight 
enclosed in the oval in the top part is the same as the “Going Out” flight in the oval of the bottom part. 
The fare in the European currency is translated using the current exchange rate on the date of the 
query. 
~41GBP 
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Figure 4: An example of price discrimination without the possibility of arbitrage. 
 
 
Note: The top part shows the fares for a round-trip originating in the UK. The bottom part reports the 
fares for a round-trip originating in a continental European location. The “Coming Back” flight 
enclosed in the oval in the top part is the same as the “Going Out” flight in the oval of the bottom part. 
The fare in the European currency is translated using the current exchange rate on the date of the 
query. 
~83GBP 
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 Figure 5 – Kernel Densities of UKirtb
EU
irtb PP /=Φ  and 
b
UKEUe / . 
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Table 1 – Number of routes, and their percentage relative to the total number operated by the company, by type of sample, airline and period.  
 
BMIBABY RYANAIR EASYJET BUZZ GOFLY MyTRAVELLITE 
Year_ 
month 
Routes  
with 
fares  
Compet. 
Routes 
Routes  
with 
fares  
Compet. 
Routes 
Routes  
with 
fares  
Compet. 
Routes 
Routes  
with 
fares  
Compet. 
Routes 
Routes  
with 
fares  
Compet. 
Routes 
Routes  
with 
fares  
Compet. 
Routes 
02_07   34 (57.6) 7 (11.9) 19 (50.0) 9 (23.7) 21 (63.6) 3 (9.1) 17 (45.9) 11 (29.7)   
02_08   37 (62.7) 8 (13.6) 19 (50.0) 9 (23.7) 21 (63.6) 5 (15.2) 17 (45.9) 11 (29.7)   
02_09   37 (62.7) 7 (11.9) 28 (70.0) 9 (22.5) 21 (63.6) 5 (15.2) 30 (85.7) 9 (25.7)   
02_10   37 (62.7) 7 (11.9) 28 (68.3) 10 (24.4) 21 (65.6) 5 (15.6) 30 (76.9) 11 (28.2)   
02_11   37 (61.7) 8 (13.3) 29 (70.7)   9 (22.0) 20 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 32 (84.2) 11 (28.9)   
02_12   37 (61.7) 8 (13.3) 61 (77.2) 20 (25.3) 22 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 32 (84.2) 11 (28.9)   
03_01 26 (74.3) 10 (28.6) 49 (80.3) 9 (14.8) 61 (76.3) 20 (25.0) 22 (100.0) 1 (4.5)     
03_02 26 (74.3) 11 (31.4) 50 (78.1) 7 (10.9) 63 (76.8) 21 (25.6) 22 (100.0) 0 (0.0)     
03_03 30 (81.1) 12 (32.4) 50 (78.1) 7 (10.9) 66 (78.6) 22 (26.2) 22 (84.6) 4 (15.4)     
03_04 26 (70.3)   9 (24.3) 56 (86.2) 7 (10.8) 66 (75.0) 19 (21.6)       
03_05 31 (77.5) 10 (25.0) 69 (78.4) 6 (6.8) 67 (75.3) 19 (21.3)       
03_06 32 (74.4) 10 (23.3) 69 (78.4) 6 (6.8) 67 (75.3) 20 (22.5)       
03_07 33 (73.3) 11 (24.4) 69 (78.4) 6 (6.8) 67 (75.3) 21 (23.6)       
03_08 34 (75.6) 11 (24.4) 83 (93.3) 8 (9.0) 88 (95.7) 24 (26.1)       
03_09 35 (79.5) 11 (25.0) 83 (93.3) 6 (6.7) 88 (95.7) 23 (25.0)       
03_10 35 (72.9) 13 (27.1) 84 (91.3) 8 (8.7) 89 (92.7) 26 (27.1)       
03_11 37 (88.1) 12 (28.6) 87 (93.5) 8 (8.6) 88 (92.6) 23 (24.2)       
03_12 38 (80.9) 15 (31.9) 87 (92.6) 8 (8.5) 88 (89.8) 25 (25.5)     13 (92.9) 5 (35.7) 
04_01 33 (67.3) 15 (30.6) 42 (42.9) 8 (8.2) 46 (46.9) 25 (25.5)     13 (92.9) 5 (35.7) 
04_02 36 (76.6) 14 (29.8) 84 (89.4) 8 (8.5) 88 (89.8) 25 (25.5)     13 (100.0) 5 (38.5) 
04_03 38 (88.4) 13 (30.2) 84 (89.4) 8 (8.5) 89 (88.1) 25 (24.8)     13 (100.0) 4 (30.8) 
04_04 34 (70.8) 17 (35.4) 87 (87.9) 10 (10.1) 89 (83.2) 27 (25.2)     13 (100.0) 4 (30.8) 
04_05 34 (68.0) 16 (32.0) 81 (86.2) 9 (9.6) 89 (80.9) 27 (24.5)     10 (100.0) 3 (30.0) 
04_06 34 (61.8) 18 (32.7) 84 (87.5) 9 (9.4) 88 (77.2) 29 (25.4)     9 (100.0) 3 (33.3) 
Source: Price sample is retrieved from the airlines’ web sites. The airlines’ total routes and the competitive routes are from the Civil Aviation Authority 
dataset. Percentages with respect to the total number of routes are in parentheses. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of ( ) UKirtcbb UKEUEUirtcb PeP −=∆ //  by company and destination.  
 Company 
Statistic Bmibaby RyanAir EasyJet Buzz GoFly MyTravel Total 
 International Flights 
p1 0.60 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.50 0.06 
p5 1.23 0.39 0.24 0.23 0.29 0.91 0.32 
p10 1.67 0.88 0.46 0.45 0.62 1.37 0.63 
p25 2.56 2.32 1.07 1.03 1.91 2.53 1.50 
p50 4.25 5.32 2.35 2.05 3.62 4.20 3.41 
p75 7.15 9.93 4.15 3.45 9.56 6.32 6.53 
p90 10.67 17.20 5.92 8.17 16.95 10.13 12.13 
p95 14.58 23.51 8.53 14.01 23.23 14.35 17.50 
p99 22.79 36.81 17.58 29.50 42.21 32.96 34.08 
mean 5.56 7.68 3.17 3.65 7.05 5.53 5.38 
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
max 79.99 79.84 79.97 79.91 79.98 79.36 79.99 
sd 4.85 8.08 3.81 5.62 8.65 5.94 6.53 
N 168750 803782 849313 42333 30957 23289 1918424 
 
Domestic Flights 
p1 0 0 0 - 0 0 0.00 
p5 0 0 0 - 0 0 0.00 
p10 0 0 0 - 0 0 0.00 
p25 0 0 0 - 0 0 0.00 
p50 0 0 0 - 0 0 0.00 
p75 0 0 0 - 0 0 0.00 
p90 0 0 0 - 0 0 0.00 
p95 0 2.52 0 - 0 0 0.00 
p99 0 10 5.00 - 10 0 5.00 
mean 0.05 0.40 0.12 - 0.26 0.00 0.18 
min 0 0 0 - 0 0 0.00 
max 55.50 63.00 75.00 - 39.15 3.99 75.00 
sd 0.88 2.05 1.39 - 2.20 0.13 1.54 
N 54601 71408 137083 - 7534 1772 272398 
Total N 223351 875190 986396 42333 38491 25061 2190822 
Source: Fares are from the airlines’ web sites. ∆ is expressed in GBP 
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Table 3 – Ratio of prices in different currencies and exchange rates, by company and country. 
 countries  Bmi 
baby 
Ryan 
Air 
Easy 
Jet 
Buzz Go 
Fly 
My 
Travel 
Total N 
b
UKEUe /  
1.00 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 1.00 1.00 272398 
UK UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  1.00 1.01 1.00 - 1.00 1.00 1.01  
b
UKEUe /  
2.22 - 2.23 2.22 - - 2.23 108534 
Switzerland UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  2.49 - 2.26 3.29 - - 2.26  
b
UKEUe /  
- 13.45 - - - - 13.45 57275 
Sweden UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  - 13.41 - - - - 13.41  
b
UKEUe /  
- 11.80 - - - - 11.80 19849 
Norway UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  - 16.99 - - - - 16.99  
b
UKEUe /  
48.24 - 48.42 - - - 48.37 10933 
No
 
Eu
ro
-
Zo
n
e
 
Czech 
Rep.  UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  56.69 - 44.88 - - - 48.12  
b
UKEUe /  
1.44 1.46 1.46 - 1.58 - 1.46 266918 
Italy UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  1.61 1.75 1.48 - 1.64 - 1.68  
b
UKEUe /  
1.46 1.46 1.47 1.54 1.58 - 1.47 287646 
France UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  1.61 1.57 1.46 1.61 1.73 - 1.53  
b
UKEUe /  
1.45 1.46 1.46 1.54 1.58 1.47 1.47 501131 
Spain UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  1.61 1.47 1.50 1.68 1.60 1.67 1.52  
b
UKEUe /  
1.46 1.45 1.47 1.52 - - 1.47 151541 
Holland UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  1.60 1.25 1.46 1.65 - - 1.46  
b
UKEUe /  
1.45 1.46 1.45 1.54 1.58 - 1.47 109645 
Germany UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  1.60 1.50 1.46 1.57 1.53 - 1.51  
b
UKEUe /  
1.45 1.47 - - - - 1.46 25006 
Belgium UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  1.61 1.41 - - - - 1.46  
b
UKEUe /  
- - 1.47 - - - 1.47 18941 
Greece UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  - - 1.51 - - - 1.51  
b
UKEUe /  
1.46 1.46 - - - 1.47 1.46 300059 
Ireland UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  1.61 1.17 - - - 1.74 1.22  
b
UKEUe /  
1.48 - 1.46 . 1.58 1.47 1.47 35268 
Portugal UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  1.60 - 1.49 . 1.57 1.67 1.51  
b
UKEUe /  
1.50 1.47 - - - - 1.47 25678 
Eu
ro
zo
n
e 
Austria UK
irtcb
EU
irtcb PP /  1.60 1.32 - - - - 1.33  
Source: Datastream for the exchange rates, price data from the airlines’ web sites. 
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Table 4 – Type of discrimination by company and departure location. 
 
  Variable “Discrimination Type” – Frequency (row %) 
 
Departure 
From 
0- Non 
discriminatory 
1 Discriminatory  
- no arbitrage  
2 Discriminatory  
-no prof. arbitrage 
3 Discriminatory  
- with arbitrage  
Cont. Europe 49534 (58.9%) 34357 (40.8%) 18 (0.0%) 211 (0.3%) 
UK 51281 (60.6%) 112 (0.1%) 24912 (29.4%) 8325 (9.8%) Bm
i 
Ba
by
 
Total 100815 (59.7%) 34469 (20.4%) 24930 (14.8%) 8536 (5.1%) 
Cont. Europe 193133 (48.1%) 62909 (15.7%) 36163 (9.0%) 109552 (27.3%) 
UK 191923 (47.7%) 143864 (35.8%) 20756 (5.2%) 45482 (11.3%) Ry
an
 
A
ir 
Total 385056 (47.9%) 206773 (25.7%) 56919 (7.1%) 155034 (19.3%) 
Cont. Europe 329673 (78.7%) 77628 (18.5%) 7665 (1.8%) 4143 (1.0%) 
UK 381208 (88.6%) 16873 (3.9%) 27315 (6.3%) 4808 (1.1%) Ea
sy
 
Je
t 
Total 710881 (83.7%) 94501 (11.1%) 34980 (4.1%) 8951 (1.1%) 
Cont. Europe 17673 (84.2%) 2463 (11.7%) 169 (0.8%) 679 (3.2%) 
UK 18437 (86.4%) 1221 (5.7%) 767 (3.6%) 924 (4.3%) Bu
zz
 
Total 36110 (85.3%) 3684 (8.7%) 936 (2.2%) 1603 (3.8%) 
Cont. Europe 9317 (60.6%) 2170 (14.1%) 1636 (10.6%) 2240 (14.6%) 
UK 9595 (61.5%) 3624 (23.2%) 504 (3.2%) 1871 (12.0%) Go
 
 
Fl
y 
Total 18912 (61.1%) 5794 (18.7%) 2140 (6.9%) 4111 (13.3%) 
Cont. Europe 6657 (61.0%) 4021 (36.9%) 62 (0.6%) 167 (1.5%) 
UK 7762 (62.7%) 188 (1.5%) 3244 (26.2%) 1188 (9.6%) MT
L 
Total 14419 (61.9%) 4209 (18.1%) 3306 (14.2%) 1355 (5.8%) 
 N 1266193 349430 123211 179590 
 %N 66.0% 18.2% 6.4% 9.4% 
Source: Our elaboration of the fares retrieved from the airlines’ web sites. 
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Table 5 – Mean of absolute difference of fares, arbitrage costs and fares by type of 
discrimination.  
  Variable “Discrimination Type”  
 
Departure 
From 
0- Non 
discriminatory 
1 Discriminatory  
- no arbitrage  
2 Discriminatory  
-no prof. arbitrage 
3 Discriminatory  
- with arbitrage  
Mean ∆  2.9 9.7 7.1 15.9 
Arbitrage Cost 7.7 10.1 9.3 11.3 
B
m
i B
ab
y 
Mean UKirtcbP  33.5 82.1 66.6 107.5 
Mean ∆  2.3 12.8 6.4 14.8 
Arbitrage Cost 7.2 7.6 7.8 7.5 
R
ya
n
 
A
ir 
Mean UKirtcbP  24.6 41.0 40.7 40.5 
Mean ∆  2.1 8.4 7.0 19.2 
Arbitrage Cost 8.0 10.1 10.6 8.8 
Ea
sy
 
Je
t 
Mean UKirtcbP  41.0 83.0 93.7 65.3 
Mean ∆  1.9 13.6 6.4 19.2 
Arbitrage Cost 8.1 8.7 10.0 7.2 
Bu
zz
 
Mean UKirtcbP  42.9 58.8 80.6 32.5 
Mean ∆  2.3 14.7 7.3 18.2 
Arbitrage Cost 9.0 9.2 10.6 9.0 G
o
 
 
Fl
y 
Mean UKirtcbP  61.3 73.6 98.1 70.6 
Mean ∆  2.9 9.7 6.9 17.4 
Arbitrage Cost 7.1 9.3 9.0 10.3 
M
TL
 
Mean UKirtcbP  22.5 66.5 60.5 89.3 
Source: Our elaboration of the fares retrieved from the airlines’ web sites. 
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Table 6 – Type of Discrimination by Season, time of booking, and price category. 
   Variable “Discrimination Type” – Row % 
Type Variable N 0 - Non 
discriminatory 
1 Discriminatory  
 no arbitrage  
2 Discriminatory  
no prof. arbitrage 
3 Discriminatory  
with arbitrage  
 Summer 1419069 63.5% 19.8% 7.1% 9.6% 
 Winter 499355 73.1% 13.7% 4.6% 8.6% 
7 173358 59.9% 22.1% 8.0% 10.0% 
10 206143 62.8% 20.2% 6.4% 10.6% 
14 229889 64.5% 18.8% 6.3% 10.4% 
21 165725 66.5% 18.2% 6.5% 8.7% 
28 165957 64.4% 18.9% 7.2% 9.4% 
35 160698 65.5% 18.6% 7.2% 8.7% 
42 161806 66.8% 17.7% 6.2% 9.4% 
49 154176 67.9% 17.3% 6.2% 8.6% 
56 154252 68.6% 16.4% 5.9% 9.1% 
63 196572 70.3% 15.6% 5.1% 9.0% 
B
o
o
ki
n
g 
D
ay
s 
70 149848 70.4% 15.6% 5.8% 8.2% 
0-9.99 204601 81.2% 9.1% 2.8% 6.8% 
10-19.99 328400 71.7% 13.7% 5.3% 9.2% 
20-39.99 562978 70.2% 14.9% 3.2% 11.8% 
40-69.99 540862 68.3% 18.1% 6.3% 7.2% Cl
as
s 
 
PU
K
 
>=70 281583 35.5% 36.9% 16.9% 10.6% 
Source: Airlines’ web sites. Price class expressed in GBP. 
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Table 7 – Mean and Standard Deviation (SD) of main regressors 
 Discriminatory Arbitrage 
 0 1 Total 0 1 Total 
Persistence 0.07 (0.25) 0.50 (0.50) 0.22 (0.41) 0.50 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 
HHI route 0.90 (0.20) 0.89 (0.19) 0.90 (0.20) 0.89 (0.20) 0.91 (0.18) 0.89 (0.19) 
Market Size 0.22 (0.19) 0.21 (0.20) 0.22 (0.19) 0.21 (0.20) 0.22 (0.19) 0.21 (0.20) 
Shr Charter Pass 0.10 (0.20) 0.13 (0.22) 0.11 (0.21) 0.16 (0.24) 0.06 (0.16) 0.13 (0.22) 
N UK departures 4.70 (4.13) 4.99 (5.40) 4.80 (4.60) 4.79 (5.02) 5.50 (6.27) 4.99 (5.40) 
N 1266193 652231 1918424 472641 179590 652231 
Source: Civil Aviation Authority; “Persistence” was calculated using the price data 
from the airlines’ web sites. Note: SD in parentheses.  
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Table 8 –– Marginal Effects for Bivariate Probit with Sample Selection – y=Pr(Discriminatory=1) and 
z=Pr(Arbitrage=1|Discriminatory=1) 
 Model 1 – Full Sample Model 2 – without EasyJet Model 3 – Only Ryan Air 
 
x
y
∂
∂
 x
z
∂
∂
 
x
y
∂
∂
 x
z
∂
∂
 
x
y
∂
∂
 x
z
∂
∂
 
Persistence 0.50 (296.0)a 0.00 (0.52) 0.46 (245.0)a 0.02 (13.0)a 0.41 (188.5)a 0.03 (13.9)a 
HHI_route -0.07 (12.8)a 0.03 (4.98)a -0.07 (6.88)a 0.05 (5.83)a -0.10 (7.24)a 0.09 (8.49)a 
Market Size 0.15 (23.4)a 0.01 (1.12) 0.17 (17.7)a 0.01 (1.23) 0.15 (14.1)a 0.02 (2.31)b 
Shr Charter Pass 0.34 (59.6)a -0.03 (4.72)a 0.49 (38.8)a 0.12 (10.6)a 0.37 (15.0)a 0.14 (10.7)a 
N UK departures  0.00 (11.0)a 0.00 (2.11)b 0.00 (7.17)a 0.00 (4.82)a 0.00 (0.60) 0.00 (3.19)a 
10 days -0.03 (12.4)a 0.03 (14.5)a 0.00 (0.11) 0.01 (6.11)a 0.00 (0.71) 0.02 (6.60)a 
14 days 0.01 (5.67)a 0.03 (13.0)a 0.06 (17.1)a 0.03 (11.8)a 0.07 (16.7)a 0.03 (10.9)a 
21 days -0.04 (19.0)a 0.02 (6.75)a -0.02 (5.32)a 0.00 (0.71) -0.01 (2.68)a 0.01 (1.69)c 
28 days -0.02 (8.56)a 0.03 (12.1)a -0.03 (7.7)a 0.03 (10.0)a -0.02 (4.31)a 0.04 (11.2)a 
35 days -0.03 (11. 8)a 0.02 (7.07)a -0.04 (11.2)a 0.01 (2.68)a -0.03 (7.34)a 0.01 (3.80)a 
42 days -0.05 (18.5)a 0.04 (14.9)a -0.05 (12.9)a 0.04 (12.4)a -0.04 (7.98)a 0.05 (13.7)a 
49 days -0.06 (23.4)a 0.03 (9.78)a -0.06 (15.1)a 0.01 (3.72)a -0.05 (9.82)a 0.02 (5.19)a 
56 days -0.08 (33.5)a 0.04 (14.1)a -0.08 (19.3)a 0.04 (10.4)a -0.06 (12.7)a 0.05 (12.8)a 
63 days -0.06 (24.2)a 0.03 (12.9)a -0.03 (7.43)a 0.03 (9.58)a -0.02 (4.18)a 0.04 (10.7)a 
70 days 0.04 (12.2)a 0.02 (8.58)a 0.09 (21.0)a 0.03 (7.23)a 0.10 (19.6)a 0.04 (9.80)a 
Summer Season 0.03 (14.8)a -0.02 (9.97)a 0.00 (0.76) -0.01 (4.95)a -0.03 (9.20)a -0.02 (6.95)a 
Ryan air 0.15 (43.0)a 0.19 (47.3)a 0.18 (44.7)a 0.25 (67.1)a   
Buzz -0.12 (27.1)a 0.14 (13.0)a -0.17 (27.9)a 0.21 (16.9)a   
GoFLY -0.04 (7.05)a 0.26 (27.1)a -0.05 (6.75)a 0.31 (32.6)a   
MyTravelLite -0.03 (5.43)a 0.05 (4.47)a -0.03 (4.13)a 0.07 (5.16)a   
EasyJet -0.26 (79.3)a -0.07 (16.2)a     
Wald Test Indep. 
equations (ρ=0) χ
2 
= 322.6a χ2 = 21.25a χ2 = 14.28a 
N 1918424 652231 1069111 513799 803782 418726 
Note: A constant was included in all regressions. Observations clustered by company, route and date of departure.  
z-statistics in parentheses: a,b,c significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Dummies for Nations, Time of flight and Day of the week included in all regressions but not reported to save space. Full set of estimates available on request. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1 illustrates two main features of the data collection strategy, that is, the 
matching of records and the control for the booking day. We begin with the latter. The 
first column identifies the date of the query for a round-trip journey: the second leg is 
normally due seven days after the first leg, with one exception on which we shall focus 
shortly. The second and the third column describe the dates of departure of each leg for 
trips originating in UK, when the date of departure is assumed to be respectively, 1, 4, 
7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 63, 70 days from the date of the query (booking days 
are reported in brackets). The fourth and fifth column do the same for trips originating 
in Italy, as we chose the route London Stansted – Rome Ciampino for example. Note 
the exception of bookings made four days prior to the departure of the first leg, which 
are combined with a second leg due ten (not eleven) days from the time of the query.  
As for the matching of records, consider the third row. It reports the dates of 
departure when the first leg is booked 7 days before. Now consider the first row. The 
second legs are booked exactly the same number of days as the first legs in the third 
row.  
For convenience, we have used Greek capital letters to identify the match of the 
two fares available, for each booking day, for the Stansted-Ciampino flight, and Greek 
lowercase letters for the two fares available for the Ciampino-Stansted flight for each 
booking day. Note how the procedure makes it impossible to match fares for departures 
1, 4, 17 and 77 days from the date of the query. Finally, it is worth clarifying how each 
row identifies a distinct query for each “directional” round-trip. Repeating the same 
procedure every day yields the possibility to collect up to eleven prices for each flight. 
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Table A1. Strategy for data collection.  
 Booking from UK Booking from Italy 
 First Leg Flight (£) Second Leg Flight (£) First Leg Flight (€) Second Leg Flight (€) 
Stansted-Ciampino Ciampino-Stansted Ciampino-Stansted Stansted-Ciampino date of booking 
 
date of departure 
(days from booking day) 
date of arrival 
(days from booking day) 
date of departure 
(days from booking day) 
date of arrival 
(days from booking day) 
01/04/2003 02/04/2003 (1) 08/04/2003 (7)α 02/04/2003 (1) 08/04/2003 (7)Α 
01/04/2003 05/04/2003 (4) 11/04/2003 (10)σ 05/04/2003 (4) 11/04/2003 (10)Σ 
01/04/2003 08/04/2003 (7)Α 15/04/2003 (14)β 08/04/2003 (7) α 15/04/2003 (14) Β  
01/04/2003 11/04/2003 (10)Σ 18/04/2003 (17) 11/04/2003 (10)σ 17/04/2003 (17) 
01/04/2003 15/04/2003 (14)Β 22/04/2003 (21)χ 15/04/2003 (14) β  22/04/2003 (21) Χ 
01/04/2003 22/04/2003 (21)Χ 29/04/2003 (28)δ 22/04/2003 (21) χ 29/04/2003 (28) ∆ 
01/04/2003 29/04/2003 (28)∆ 06/05/2003 (35)ε 29/04/2003 (28) δ 06/05/2003 (35) Ε 
01/04/2003 06/05/2003 (35)Ε 13/05/2003 (42)φ 06/05/2003 (35) ε 13/05/2003 (42) Φ 
01/04/2003 13/05/2003 (42)Φ 20/05/2003 (49)γ 13/05/2003 (42) φ 20/05/2003 (49) Γ 
01/04/2003 20/05/2003 (49)Γ 27/05/2003 (56)η 20/05/2003 (49) γ 27/05/2003 (56) Η 
01/04/2003 27/05/2003 (56)Η 03/06/2003 (63)ι 27/05/2003 (56) η 03/06/2003 (63) Ι 
01/04/2003 03/06/2003 (63)Ι 10/06/2003 (70)λ 03/06/2003 (63) ι 10/06/2003 (70) Λ 
01/04/2003 10/06/2003 (70)Λ 17/06/2003 (77) 10/06/2003 (70) λ 17/06/2003 (77) 
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Appendix B – Defining “Discrimination Type” 
Recalling equation (2) and that discrimination is possible only on the second leg 
of a round-trip, the values assigned to “Discrimination Type” satisfy the conditions 
outlined in Table B1, where “UK” and “Cont.EU” identify the location of the departure 
airport and AC is defined in (3). 
Table B1 – Conditions used to derive the values for Discrimination Type in the 
text. 
Discrimination 
Type values 
Condition Logic 
Oper. 
Condition 
0 – Non 
Discriminatory. 
|∆|<5 
 
 
1- Discrimin. 
no arbit.  
(UK AND ∆≤-5) OR (Cont.EU AND ∆≥5) 
2 – Discrimin. 
No prof arbit. 
(UK AND ∆≥5 AND ∆≤AC) OR (Cont.EU AND ∆≤-5 AND 
∆≥-AC) 
3– Discrimin. 
with prof arbit. 
(UK AND ∆≥5 AND ∆≥AC) OR (Cont.EU AND ≤-5 AND 
∆≤-AC) 
 
To explain the conditions, we refer to the first column, since the same logic 
applies to the conditions used in the last column. No discrimination is observed if the 
absolute difference between the two fares is less than 5 GBP. When UKirtcbP  is at least 
5GBP higher than b UKEU
EU
irtcb eP // , then a continental European will prefer to buy the fare 
in her national currency: in any case, the Britons are adversely discriminated (value 1). 
Even when b UKEU
EU
irtcb eP //  is at least 5GBP more expensive than 
UK
irtcbP , a continental 
European may not find it profitable to exercise arbitrage as its benefit (i.e., ∆) may be 
smaller than its costs (value 2). In this case, the continental Europeans are adversely 
discriminated. Finally, the arbitrage is profitable in the case of value 3.  
 
 
